

Just a brief note in response. Yes, I deny that truth has legitimate meaning. Of course it's used to endorse belief, etc. But I don't think there's some ineffable, minimal who-knows-what that deserves respect. I don't like truth as a thing-in-itself. I see the ideas as related.

I think we can get by with warranted belief. I think I manage this by making belief fundamental. But this works (as I see it) because I take perspective to go all the way down. Belief is (roughly) the meaning-structure of a state of affairs. Also, in a wider sense, of a "phenomenal streaming" of "the-world-from-a-point-of-view."

I've run into those who want to understand belief as taking-to-be-true. I can see why they are tempted to say this. Yes, we call our own beliefs true. What I object to here is the neglect of the "perspectival character" of the world.

To take truth as fundamental is to tacitly postulate an aperspectival reality as an *accomplished* reality out there somewhere that functions as a truth-maker for some beliefs.

To be clear, I think that language is immediately world-directed, immediately social, in a special sense. So my beliefs are beliefs about *our* world.

I came that it's nonsense to talk about beliefs being *made true*. We can of course explain why X has this or that belief. We can and do argue why any rational person *should* believe P. But that's about it.

I endorse something like a correspondence theory of belief. An articulated empirical belief represents or pre-presents a situation that might become empirically present. This empirical presence is not some absolute, magical thing. People can be in the same room and disagree about what is going on there. The empirical suggests a “sensory presence” that confirms or strengthens belief so that a possible situation is now described as actual. But this actual situation can be demoted. This fluidity is one reason to be skeptical about a truth that is beyond belief, warranted or not.

Some will grant that the great truth-maker is not available. We can't *know* whether our beliefs are true or not. But this doesn't change the “fact” that they are.

I don't pretend to be able to disprove such a spectral truthmaking reality. It's a bit like the concept of Matter that was and is supposed to be more than (roughly) the interpersonal possibility of perceptual presence. So I instead just try to point out its uselessness. To me it looks like superstition. Like letting the utility of the word truth trick one into a pointless dualism.

I've made a few videos about this, and I can imagine disappointed irrationalists discovering that I am anti-truth as an uptight rationalistic empiricist, and not as a would-be overman or a pastel New Age hippy type. Ernst Mach is one of my heros. The problem with truthers is that they aren't rational enough. The concept of truth is, you might say, a superstition favored by philosophers. If they defend it against irrational-

ists, they are right in spirit. It is basically juvenile or a performative contradiction to argue against rationality itself. But we don't need truth for rationality, and I think it's even a mystification. It's a bit like defending physics by insisting that the current theories are God's final word. It's a little more sophisticated than this. But it is roughly the belief that God's final word is out there, whether or not we can find it.

The belief in some external truthmaker is the belief in a pre-articulated reality. That tacit equation of thought and being. My own approach in terms of belief is an explicit equation of thought and being. I only mean that belief is the "thought-being" *structure* of world-from-perspective. What James called a "personal continuum" is *more* than thought-being, but its speakable essence (its intelligible structure) is what I mean by belief. Now this belief changes, evolves, settles, etc. A philosopher assembles what he or she thinks are "good" beliefs. Good in the sense of rational, warranted, economical, and so on.

Some think that I must be saying that it is true that there is no truth. Not so. I'm just suggesting that truth is basically a decorate wheel without a function. I'm trying to offer what I believe is a shortcut. Let's do better than truth-minimalism. Let's see what we can do with warranted belief.