

So *how* do objects exist ? I think we can do without “consciousness,” but that’s because I explain what is called “consciousness” *as* the partial presence of objects. Reality needs no witness. The apparent witness is one more thing that just is.

I understand that *in some sense* tool-being works in the background. Even when I don’t notice it, the floor holds me up. But I have to remember this, intend the floor, then understand that it has been there all along. So the tool-being of the floor depends on its being present. I “infer” that it has been there all along. It’s absence or tool-being is an *idea*.

This is not about Dasein as *human* being. In some sense, idea is prior to human being, the condition for the possibility of human being. For the presence of human being as such. This is not an empirical claim. I mean the very category of human being is just that, an intelligible category.

So idea isn’t psychological. Idea, as essentially communicable, is *weird*. Is there being without meaning ? Ideas of a pre-conceptual sensual plenum. But call it *a* plenum is to grasp its being. The idea of its being. The unified it-is-there-ness of its hypothetical being.

Is this some kind of Platonism ? Is it a *purified* “post-subject” idealism ? Idea as prior to subject and object. Maybe related to Derrida’s difference. I like Saussure. System of differences without positive elements. But I think there *are* positive elements, even if such elements are indeed systematic, and have to be explicated in terms of one another.

A thing is an ideal manifold. A thing is an idea that may organize a manifestation that is *also* sensory. A “light” thing, a concept, may need just a little bit of sensory presence to be. The sounds of words. The memory of sounds of words in the imagination. Also, I think, a theme for Derrida. The ideal and the sensory are not absolutely distinct. Of course. For we are back at difference. The ideal is the not-sensory. The sensory is the not-ideal.

Ideas are ideal. The object is project. The thing unfinished. The thing is *ajar*. From the thesis to the shoe lace. Ajar.

The world neither mind or matter. But if we say that it is the ideal and the sensory, we only desubjectivize an old distinction. The “sensory” recalls the sense organs. But here the sense organs are derivative, explanatory. Mach’s functional relationships. Sense organs as causes of sensation is speculative, empirical. Not explicative.

Ideal-categorical “articulation” of the qualitative plenum. A “plenum” that itself only exists as part this articulation. Unity is conceptual. Plurality is conceptual. Kant comes to mind, the part that I haven’t studied very closely. The logical categories are ontological. I feel myself close to Hegel here. Like maybe I should *really* read the Logic.

And yet there’s something to be said for suffering and chasing these issues personally. Wait to *feel* the question.