

You asked me to sell what I'm up to with a minimum of jargon. I'll try.

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My foolosophy is about the gush of life. This gushing of life is the gushing of world-from-perspective. Your life is gushing of our world. My life is a gushing of world. Just one world, from many many many points of view.

Obvious, right ? My foolosophy appropriates or explicates common sense. It is not only common sense. People mostly just *live* their common sense. If you ask them to talk about it, you will maybe get obsolete bad philosophy. Dualism. Consciousness and the physical. Stuff that people pick up from sci-fi. Vague memories of that one philosophy class they took. A YouTube video where Hoffman tells them that their experience is a user-interface. That reality isn't what they think it is. At all. Which, by the way, is a very seductive idea. *Because* it is *more sci-fi*. Heavy on the fi.

What do most people want more ? Some fun sci-fi or some "serious" buzz-kill rationalism ? Science fiction or philosophy of science ? Science fiction, of course. They may *live* their common sense, but free time is play time. This play is time is free *from* common sense.

I don't blame anyone for a little escapism. I'm a fan of sci-fi.

The point is to emphasize the chasm between living common sense and explicating common sense. Why would anyone bother with such an enterprise ? That's a tough question. I see it as (among other things) a form of art. It's also a kind of puzzle solving. How can our most basic concepts be put together in a nice ? How *have* they been put together ?

What, if anything, is consciousness ? What, if anything, is physical stuff ? What does it mean to launch a *what* at such basic concepts ? Am I in a bubble of consciousness ? Do I have to infer my way out of a private illusion ? Am I, *as* an I, a jar of representations ?

What, if anything, is meaning ? How does meaning work ? What, if anything, is communication ? How, if at all, do we share a world ?

What, if anything, is truth ? What is belief ? What is rationality ? What is science ?

These grand questions might also be called silly questions.

One of many ways to look at philosophy is as a history of vivid personalities who had strong opinions on the questions above. Sometimes they had answers. Sometimes they claimed an answer was impossible or that a particular question was meaningless.

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Now for some of my answers:

What is truth ? Nothing really. A mystification. A way of talking about belief. In blunt terms, there's really just belief, which can be weaker or stronger.

What is meaning ? Something basically irreducible. Something primary, fundamental, radically taken for granted. Meaning is "deeper than" the subject who asks the question. For the question is possible "through meaning" or "as meaning."

What is consciousness ? Not a stuff. It is the presence of world. The presence of world from a perspective. This world-from-perspective is *associated* with a human or a dog or an alien who is therefore said to be "sentient" or "conscious."

To "have consciousness" is to be a "site" of the world's streaming. This streaming of the world has a "from-a-point-of-view-ness." As in the heads side of the penny is present rather than the tails side. *Penny brown penny brown penny. I am duped by a loop of her hair.*

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More Q & A:

What is a thing ? What, first, is a physical thing ? I see the penny. It stands out from the background as a unity. The penny is *a penny*. Not originally a

brown circle. The heads side is present perhaps. I see (technically) a side of the penny. But usually I take this side of the penny to *be* the penny. I don't usually "interpret" that brown sense as the presence of a side. But I *can* do this. I can "thematize" the side of the penny. We are so good at thematizing weird things (much weirder than this) that it tends to confuse philosophers.

Am I hallucinating the penny ? It's logically possible. I usually need a reason to think so. I might decide that the penny is a hallucination. I might decide that this penny was part of a dream. But the penny is "there" and "speakable as a penny" in any case. So the penny is a speakable intentional object in any case. I can't categorize it as either "physical" or "imagined" without first "gripping it" as that thing it is. Like I said, it is foreground as a unity, as a thing apart from other things that might also be there.

Now for meaning. I can tell someone about this penny. I can write about it in my journal. Others can discuss with me whether or not it was "really" there.

A crucial point : I claim that this "discussability" of the penny is the "center" or "essence" of its reality. I can also discuss "my" toothaches with others. So hallucinations and toothaches have a public reality. Of course we take for granted that only I get to *feel* my toothache. But, strangely, even that "private pain" is one more discussable intentional entity. People might debate whether I am *faking* a toothache to get out of some unpleasant responsibility. Note that this un-

pleasant responsibility is another discussable public entity. It's out there in the world. People can argue about this responsibility. Is it genuine ?

So we have this set of discussible intentional entities. I claim that all of these entities are real. Obviously we have a limited, practical notion of what is real. The penny is real, in this sense, if it is not a hallucination. I have no objection to this casual, practical use of real. But it leads to confusion if it gets uncritically adopted by "serious" philosophy.

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Note that all these things are discussable. They are *between us*. Things are not inside us. I claim that I see the penny itself. Not a user-interface hallucination created by the brain that hopefully corresponds to a truly real Penny-in-itself.

I don't know if I should argue for that here. That still-common view was demolished long ago. It's like people who kept trying to square the circle after it was proved to be impossible. People didn't see the proof or didn't understand it. Or they were not interested in it. Squaring the circle was a metaphysical adventure. More alchemy than chemistry.

The lovable mob will always prefer their sci-fi. So some guy with STEM credentials who reheats this gee-whiz theory is likely to be embraced. The problem is, of course, that philosophy is not a spectator sport.

To be fair, I've seen some smart people, legends in

their own field, get sucked into the vortex of consciousness mysticism. Add some quantum mechanics and you have a winner on your hands. Reputation, consciousness, quantum mechanics. People mostly want a good yarn. Blow their minds and sell them a shiny new Jesus. Scientism and mysticism hand in hand. And scientism has always been perhaps an inverted mysticism.

You start with a dualism and mystify either side. Or, if you are clever, both at the same time. I'm a fool, in practical terms, to oppose this. I don't even get paid to defy the market. The academic insider market is different. There one is held to higher standards. But we know how tough it is to get a toe-hold in The Castle.

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How would my philosophy fare among the academics ? My content is compatible. Some of my crucial influences were insiders. But my style maybe not. Yet I don't necessarily want my style to fit in there. I like the idea of being the Bukowski of phenomenology. Sartre was pretty good at this, but he did this to some degree through being committed to The Cause.

Left wing, right wing, broken wing. Sartre the commie. Heidegger the nazi. People obsess over this stuff as primarily avatar-centric tribal creatures. Because, I suggest, they aren't that interested in philosophy proper. And who can blame them ? So a strong

philosopher, who is only strong through their actual content, is reduced to a hero or villain or anti-hero. Derrida's Hollywood mug and association with grad school idealism meant more (of course) than his difficult theory of meaning. Phonocentrism was a vague synonym for all of the other naughty isms. He also played into this avatar-centrism. Which worked at the time but maybe makes him seem more dated than he is.

Nietzsche is a supreme example of the workings of avatar-centrism. In his manic mode, he overestimated his novelty. A master of macho rhetoric, he continues to seduce young men. I too was fascinated in a shallow way by Nietzsche. I liked him, to some degree, for the wrong reasons. I think we all start in the usual avatar-centrism. We shop for personality. We browse for ego-ideals.

It's still hard to get a conversation going online without invoking one of these holy or infamous names. I think J. S. Mill's phenomenalism was great. If I try to call attention to it, I mostly fail, because he is not *already* recognized. On the off chance that I succeed, then maybe I am credited for re-injecting Mill or Feuerbach or Mach into the conversation.

Do I want to succeed ? Yes. Do I expect to ? Not really. There are just not many consumers out there. I'd count it a significant success if I made a "philosophy friend" this way. Obviously I'd like to make enough money to squeak by in this world. To live in a modest way from my art. A familiar dream. I can relate to the struggling actor who believes in their craft.

In their case, there are plenty of consumers but also many more rivals. I say that because I don't run into many non-academic producers of philosophy. There are readers who will chat about philosophy on Reddit. They are proud of their knowledge. But, in my experience, they don't project their own philosophy as maybe worth studying. It is perhaps seen as arrogance to offer philosophy seriously. Which perhaps it is. If arrogance is the right word. We might compare those who are proud of their taste in music, and proud to enjoy obscure bands, to those who are also ambitious to be part of one of those great bands. Though philosophy is lonelier than that. I was in some of those self-important ambitious bands. It was nice to share the dream with others.

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More foolosophy. A thing is the ideal unity of its faces. The synthesis of its effigies. As logical-intentional object in the space of reasons, the object is transcendent. It is beyond me and, more exactly, *between us*.

The appearance of the object is an aspect or moment of the object. Recall the penny from before. I see it mostly from overhead. It appears as a brown ellipse, with letters and Lincoln's head on it. I see it from this or that angle in this or that light. I see it also as *a penny*. So we have the "imminent" "sensory material" that is "informed" by the recognition of this sensory part of the penny *as* a penny. Immanent aspect of the transcendent entity. The sensory and the

conceptual. The color-stuff and the idea. But fundamentally just the penny. The “raw sensory material” is a theoretical addition. An abstraction. The idea is somewhat detachable. I may forget how exactly the penny appeared to me but remember that I saw a penny. I may remember that I saw the heads side of the penny, etc. I may write down “I saw the heads side of the penny” and then fall over dead. Others can read my last words.

These words are signs that somehow represent an empirical situation. Perception itself is *not* representation. But marks and noises somehow do represent situations that can become empirically present. This is the famous picture theory, which I think is correct. This is also the correspondence theory of belief rather than truth.

We can decide that a possible state of affairs is actual or empirically present. We can change our minds later. We can decide that it was all a dream. You might say that the actual is an intensification of the possible. It has the structure of the possible.