

ONTOCUBISM is neutral monism + perspectivism. Note that such perspectivism must be understood in an ontological sense. For ontocubism, there is no “aperspectival” world. Ontocubism might also be called “logical phenomenalism.” But such “phenomenalism” should not be understood (as it too often is) in terms of subjective idealism.

Influences on the neutral monism component include Mach, Mill, and James. Influences on the perspectivism include Nietzsche, Leibniz, and Schrödinger. Husserl’s discussion of objects given in terms of ad-umbrations was also a key influence, and this was also developed by Sartre. Note that Sartre’s insistence on the transcendence of the ego — and therefore, implicitly, on “consciousness” as the presence of the world — also contributed to the phenomenalism (understood in terms of neutral monism.)

Note that merely understanding what James intended by “personal continuum” sets the stage for the next step, which is to account for a *plurality* of streams. Neutral monists like Mach, Mill, and James tended to focus on a single “nondual streaming” of the world. If one simply extends a local or personal understanding of the stream to others, one gets the “ontological perspectivism” without much effort. If one builds on the insight of neutral monism, then one can’t explain the transcendence of objects in terms of an aperspectival world. Instead the object is conceived as the logical synthesis of its appearances in streams at different times. The word “moment” is the best technical term for one of these appearances, because “moment”, un-

like appearance, isn't associated with images or substitutes. The object is constituted by these moments. The "substance" of the object is "logical." "Bite the object like a false coin, you will not taste its essence." This "essence" is the "ideality" or "signitive presence" of the object. It is the "logical form" of the object, which is part of its perceptual presence. It enables the recognition of the object. One might say that sensation is organized by conceptuality or ideality.

We shouldn't leave out Wittgenstein, whose early work gives us both phenomenalism and belief as the signitive presence informing the fluid perceptual presence of the world.

This discussion of influences should make it clear that "ontocubism" is just a repackaging of old ideas, though some curation is involved.

The emphasis on our world-constituting "being-together-in-language" is largely inspired by Heidegger.

Finally Brandom plays an important role. Foregrounding the ontological horizon or normatively organized space of reasons offers strong support for neutral monism. The "flat ontology" of inferential's "semantic holism" motivates the dissolution of "mind" and "matter" taken as separate fundamental substances.