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We can understand what is called "phenomenal consciousness" as the presence the world. The world is logically or conceptually structured. It is "immediately" meaningful. It is "immediately" a sequence or continuum of "states of affairs" or situations. To put in a humorous way, it is immediately mediated. In other words, the "given" is a myth, and "sensation" is tied up "immediately" with apperception or conceptuality. We live in a world of people and things in relationship. We care. We make plans. The presence of the world is perspectival. It has the shape of the "experience" of a situated organism.

An entity is the logical synthesis of its moments. A logical synthesis is a temporal and interpersonal synthesis. To grasp a thing *as* an entity is to unify its actual and possible "appearances" (moments, aspects) over time *and* over the plurality of actual *and possible* phenomenal streams. Possibility is primary rather than secondary. Entities are "ajar." Transcendence involves a genuine futurity. We "track" entities as "systems of possibility." Our concepts themselves (our basic categories) are subject to change.

The presence of an entity is merely "signitive" or "logical" when it is intended in its empirical absence. I can remember my deceased grandfather. I can argue against the likelihood of a situation. The empirical presence of an entity is also signitive or logical, but now that signitive-logical presence organizes "sensation." A "logical there-ness" is supplemented with a "sensory there-ness." This is a way to understand Wittgenstein's picture theory. Somehow inscriptions or sounds are tied up with signitive presence, and this signitive presence can be supplemented or enriched with sensory presence. "Perceptual presence" is signitive presence plus sensory presence. But sensory presence (perception) is made possible by an "organizing conceptuality" (by signitive presence as the "detachable" "idea" of a *possible* state of affairs.)

I recognize an old friend on the street who I happened to be thinking about. In both cases, the same friend was intended. But there on the street he is now empirically as well as logically present. To recognize is to "project" such signitive presence.

"Logic is the essence of the world." Signitive presence is a condition for the possibility of "empirical" presence, of perception. The word apperception might also be used in order to emphasize the logical-conceptual "core" of the perceived. This might be described as a "taking as." I recognize/organize "sensation" by "taking it as" this or that state of affairs. It is because "experience" or the world is "immediately meaningful" that language can "picture" the possible as well as the actual.

Belief is the "meaning structure" of a streaming of the world. Belief only represents in the limited context of signitive-only versus empirical-also presence. In other words, representation is intra-worldly. I can sketch an expected or likely state of affairs. But the representational metaphor does not make sense when extended so that a "consciousness" stuff is constituted by images of some other kind of stuff.

The world is a system of "neutral phenomenal streamings". Reality itself is "perspectival." Each stream is organized by a "prepersonal logic", which is roughly "the who of everyday dasein." This "prepersonal" "significance" is just the "meaning-structure" of the "lifeworld." In other words, the world is given in streams of situations or states of affairs that have a "logical structure" which can be articulated in assertions or questions. The world includes, for instance, a glass of orange juice on the table. As opposed to a chaos of raw sensation. "Most" of "my" conceptuality is inherited and shared with others. Such "prepersonal" significance makes communication possible.

In traditional terms, a streaming of the world is the "experience" or "phenomenal consciousness" of an organism. We can avoid this language because it obscures the identity of such "consciousness" with the perspectival *presence* of the world. This conception of the world as given only as a system of streams is *not* subjective idealism. To put it bluntly, world and not "mind" is primary. While streams are indeed structured — to some degree — like the "inside" of a "mind", a "subjective idealist approach" misunderstands the nature of language and logic to be "interior" to a mind-stuff, when instead logic or language is a condition for the possibility of the performance of selfhood as a learned institution. The "metaphysical subject" is discarded as a byproduct of unwarranted dualist or representational presuppositions. The "empirical linguistic ego" is an aspect or component of the "forum" which takes its place as ontology's necessarily presupposed entity. A particular body is trained into an institution of responsibility. "One is one around here." Selfhood is not "under" but "within" the "grammar" or "logic" that structures the world. This "forum" is synonymous with "being-together-in-language" — with the basic structure of the lifeworld as a world that is shared.

The claims presented here are far from original. "Ontocubism" tweaks its influences slightly by emphasizing the "ontological perspectivism" implied by (for instance) Mach in his *The Analysis of Sensations*. Philosophers working on similar themes can reach me at blackfl0wers@tutanota.com (Please note the zero in flowers.)