

1

The “substance” of a thing is “logical.” A spatial-visual thing is the system of its aspects. Possible aspects too. For others *as much as* for me. “Matter” as a system of possible “sensation.” Husserl basically elaborates Mill. Mach gives us the phenomenal field, which crucially includes the empirical ego as body functionally related to other elements in that field. These elements can be unified into objects. Or rather we start with mundane objects and analyze them into elements. But Mach is not Heidegger. Nor is Mill Husserl. Elaboration matters. Recontextualizing in the right total framework matters.

2

This is one reason why I try to eject the word “consciousness.” Phenomenology is ontology that studies the world. The form of the world. Why was Schopenhauer so turned on by the Kantian thought that time and space were illusory ? Because ontology lusts to overcome time and space. To discover the permanent basic form of reality. What Schopenhauer didn't see was that thought *takes time*. To speak to is make music with Saussure's “thought-sound.” Is the Pythagorean theorem “actually” timeless ? In a certain narrow sense perhaps. Like the number 7. But knowledge is articulated, like music, in time. It is applied in the time-like streaming of life. So we get the idea that *time itself* is the form of reality. That time

“is” being.

3

In the total stream of life, space is just as important as time. I live in space-and-time. But some entities aren't extended. Like music. Like the interior monologue. But all entities, extended or not, need time in order to be. As logical collections of their moments.

4

Time shows by hiding and hides by showing. The present (the present moment of an entity) occludes other moments of that entity that might be present. Of course the full present is not just this or that moment of an entity. It is a rich situation, which is fringed. States of affairs contain or organize many entities. Or many moments of entities usually grasped as those entities.

5

We don't usually thematize the moment or aspect as such. As with Mach's elements. They are the result of a phenomenological analysis. But Mach saw that we had a certain freedom to thematize this or that. I can thematize the coat or a button on the coat. Or the cloth that the coat is made of. Or the factory where it was made. And so on. I can thematize its color as such. I can thematize the way it fits.

6

What does “pain” mean to other people ? Does the beetle really drop out of consideration ? I don’t think so. The substance of pain is logical. I know that pain does not have its meaning *only* through me. But this does not mean that pain doesn’t have a cumulative meaning. Pain-for-me is an aspect of pain. If others enjoy what they call “pain,” then I will suspect we are intending something different.

7

I claim that empirical-linguistic egos are associated with ontological egos which are “sites of the world’s streaming being.” Can I prove this ? If I assume that proof is meaningful, then maybe I can. Can I assume that proof is meaningful ? Are there logical norms if I am the only non-android left. Or the only “android” that happens to “have” an “ontological ego” ? Happens to find myself at the center of a streaming of the world ? But is an “android” really an empirical-linguistic ego without an associated ontological ego ?

8

It’s trivial to sweep such questions away by an appeal to what is practical. Or it has been trivial to do so. As so-called AI gets better, this question may become serious. Joe might fall in love with his oper-

ating system. Or with the latest girlfriend doll. Does his girlfriend doll really love him ? She “acts like she does.” Should she have the right to vote ? The right to leave him for someone else ? Is it cruel to think of her as property ? As a tool or means rather than an end in “herself” ? Sci-fi movies help make it plausible that this will become a burning issue.

9

Operational consciousness is consciousness-from-the-outside. What convinces us to treat certain entities as capable of suffering ? As deserving consideration which is not given to stone in a rock quarry ? Or even to a plant ?

10

I don't believe in consciousness as a stuff that emerges from some other kind of stuff. Matter is “made of” “ontological consciousness.” Because such ontological consciousness is just the streaming being of the world. On the other hand, this streaming of the world is *located*. My wife, I believe, is at the center of such a stream. She “has” the world. Finds herself in our-world-from-her-perspective.

11

So even though consciousness is not a stuff, these located streamings of our-world-from-a-perspective are analogous to such stuff. Of course I feel clever or

whatnot to see that “matter” has its being only in these located streamings. A peculiar situation. These streamings of the world are even mobile. They follow a body, keep its nose in the “picture.” The ontological cubism of *GoldenEye* on the N64. A proof of concept. With 4 players, you have 4 screens, 4 ontological egos. In which the empirical-egos appear. “My” ontological ego includes the arm of my empirical ego. Holding a weapon. Your empirical ego, face and all, can appear in my ontological ego. But my face is available to you and not to me. Of course in the usual course of the game I can see your screen, your ontological ego. And even in real life there are mirrors. But basically Douglas Harding is right. No-face to face. Asymmetrical situation.

12

Do androids carry a streaming of the world around with them ? That helps to carry them ? For they walk in world that only exists in and through such streams. According to my phenomenism/perspectivism of course. Do I actually believe they do ? No. Not yet. But can I imagine a conclusive test ? No. As they get better and better, the issue of “consciousness” — in the modified form described above — will even challenge the phenomenalist who “doesn’t believe in” consciousness-as-stuff. But only in located-but-mobile streamings of the world. Ethically the problem is the same.

13

This is connected to the problem of which objects are hallucinations and which are practically real. Is that red couch *really* there? As in pragmatic reality. Real of course as at least hallucination. How do I check? Let's say I can't go to it and touch it. I can only see it from a distance. I ask others: do you see a red couch? I assume that these words mean the same (or same enough) to them as they mean to me. I assume they won't generally lie. Do I also assume that the our-world-from-their-perspective streams for them? With them at the center? In purely practical terms, it may not matter. I may need the stupid police robots to agree with me. So that I'm not put in a rubber room. But I think I want "real" others to "really" see it. To be in an actual meaning space with me. The space of reasons. Where I can intend the couch or the place where it seems to be. Intend it as a state of affairs that others can confirm.

14

Can I be sure that others know what I mean by the "being" of the world? The strange "fact" that it is "there"? Is meaning in general founded on that kind of trust? As "immediately" for others, if not given through the same aspect?

Someone now in 2024 could imagine a plausible future where it would at least be technically possible to surround a “real boy” (with an ontological ego) with androids who looked and acted so real that they were taken for humans. A twist on *The Truman Show*. This is not a brain in a vat. This is a person in a diabolically constructed piece of the real world. Perhaps this real boy is raised by such androids, grows up only around such androids. Would his transition to the rest of the world — to being with other real boys and girls — be especially jarring? If the androids are good enough, maybe not. But what would be jarring is the revelation that they were machines. Would this real boy see other real boys as machines? Or continue to see machines as real boys? Why not two kinds of machines? Flesh-and-blood machines versus less organic machines?

GoldenEye again. Ontological cubism. This time, in an alternate history, you can play people online. Their ontological ego (their multiplayer screen) doesn't appear on your TV but theirs. So we get Douglas Harding *GoldenEye*. But the server uses NPCs if there aren't enough real players available. Without telling you. So you have to figure out if your opponent has an ontological ego to go along with the empirical ego that appears (and helps constitute) your ontological ego. An analogue of our real life situation. Especially

if androids get very convincing. We only have access to the performance of their avatar, to their empirical ego. How do they play ? Perhaps the coders who work for the company take a perverse pleasure in simulating the quirks of “real boy” players. Even at the cost of making their NPCs less formidable. Indeed, the coders actually prioritize making their fake boy players indistinguishable from real boy players. And this hints at companies that will want their girlfriend dolls to be as desirable as possible. Not primarily through external sexual traits. But instead through seeming real. So that their love-suggesting actions are taken for real girl love. The heteronormativity is not of course important here. It’s just convenient for keeping track of consumer versus product in this example. We might even imagine a more distant future of sexually undifferentiated green-skinned photosynthetic neohumans, who reproduce their flesh-and-blood species using technology. So no one has to carry the egg while someone else carries the sperm. We can repeat the situation with NPCs and post-dimorphic love dolls.

17

Ayer’s verification principle. Meaning as what makes true, what allows for verification. Which jars with his deflationary analysis of truth. Surprised he didn’t see that. Then verification becomes merely psychological. Empirical. No longer philosophy. He tried to offer a picture of picturing itself. Somehow very young Wittgenstein had already worked through all of that

and knew to avoid that mistake. Made the impossibility of picturing picturing itself thematic. The world is immediately and primordially meaningful. And strangely we can picture possible states of affairs or situations with noises and marks. What does it mean for a string of phonemes to signify? We know and yet it's too close to us. I know meaning when I hear it. When I read it. I can "read off" a situation "into words." A primordial human ability. And yet learned, developed.

18

Hamlet was poisoned through the ear (figuratively) by a story of his father being poisoned through the ear (literally). Diabolical invention. Like Oedipus and his mother fulfilling the prophecy precisely by trying to evade it. Beautiful piece of plot sculpture. And such sculpture is especially translatable. We can imagine that Claudius killed his brother in some other way and then, in some variant of Hamlet, intentionally started a rumor that his brother was poisoned through the ear. As a perverse joke, given that his intention was really to trouble Hamlet, as a pretext to doing away with a rival. Maybe Hamlet's father wasn't assassinated at all in this variant, but did something manly and brave and reckless and got himself killed. So Claudius tries to inspire a confused treason in Hamlet, poisons him through the ear — with a story about poisoning his father through the ear. Because he also wants to prove that he's craftier than Hamlet. Wants Hamlet to figure it out later, as he waits for execution.

That he, Hamlet, was actually the poisoned one. Perhaps in this variant we give Claudius the profound monologues.