Traditionally, being is substance. Being is what does not change. Being is whatever is always present. If there is such a "thing."

 $\mathbf{2}$

To see one side of a coin is to not see the other. To see both sides takes time. Or rather times. Because you don't ever get to see them at once, at the same time. It takes times to see the coin.¹

Time shows one side only by hiding the other. Time is a showing-hiding or hiding-showing.

In this sense, time itself is a coin with two sides. Showing and hiding are two sides of the same coin. Showing "is" hiding.

This means that the coin is never fully or perfectly or finally present. It is "spread out" over the "times" it takes to show itself.

3

What, if anything, is always present? Time itself, that shows all other things only by also hiding them. Time, that presents and yet refuses to fully present all other entities, is itself always present, as a disclosure that is always also occlusion.

In this sense, *time* is being.

¹We might also imagine a spotlight that illuminates, at any given moment, only part of an otherwise dark stage.

Is time a being? An entity? The concept of time is a being, an entity among others. Indeed, this essay is an attempt to further reveal the concept of time within time.² To show another "side" or "face", or "aspect" of the concept of time. Another "time" or "moment" of the concept of time.

5

But what is time "made of"? We say that time "streams." That time is like a river. A river of what? A stream of what?

A stream of "times" perhaps. But what are these "times" if not the "sides" or "aspects" of entities?

6

But what are entities themselves "made of"? This is where phenomenalism, understood as immaterialism, comes to our aid. Entities are "made of" their "sides" or "aspects."

These "aspects" are *not* representations. As if the entity could be meaningful apart from the "aspects" that are, after all, its manifestation. Time *presents* the entity, if only ever partially. If only by hiding most of it away. As if one "aspect" covers over all the others, presents itself by blocking out the others.

"Aspect" is a visual metaphor, but this is not just

 $^{^2}$ More exactly, it's an attempt to paraphrase and make more accesible Heidegger and others.

a fact about vision. I listen to piano sonata. I hear one part of it at a time. I cannot hear it all instantaneously.

7

Perhaps we should speak of the "times" or "moments" then of music, given its invisibility. It "gives" itself as a series or rather a continuum of its "times" or "moments."

So we have "moments" as a generalization of "aspects," which not only covers the visual-spatial entities we started with but all entities.³

If we put all of this together, we see that entities are "made of" their "moments" or "times."

8

What is time made of? "Times" or "moments." What are entities made of? "Times" or "moments." Time, we said, is a "stream" of such "moments." Time is a stream of what entities are "made of." Time is a streaming then of the "being" of entities.

9

Is time an entity? Or is time rather the always-partial "presence" or "being" of entities in general?

³More exactly, "moments" works for all entities that "need time" to "give" themselves, which is to say all beings except for being itself.

Time is a streaming of the "aspects" of entities. In this sense, it is the "variable aspect." It is all entities and therefore none of them. It makes present by making absent. It gives by taking away.

Being is whatever is always present. Only the showing-hiding we call "time" achieves this. This is implied already, latently, by the stream metaphor. The (non-dual) phenomenal stream is time. Time is the being of entities, the "play" of their presence/absence. The arrival and departure of their moments.

10

The entity is the temporal-logical-interpersonal synthesis of its moments. The entity "needs time" in order to "be." We, ourselves temporal creatures, refer to enduring entities that "show" themselves to others as well as ourselves. But we know that the same entity can show a different "face" to others. Yet we *intend* the entity as it also shows itself to others. This is as familiar as talking about a work of art, and sharing one's "perspective" on it. Such talk is unthinkable without our ability to intend the same entity seen "differently"—from a different "point of view." ⁴

⁴In other essays, I elaborate on an understanding of the world as a plurality of nondual phenomenal streams. This conception only makes sense if the empirical ego is grasped as one entity in the world. This is Wittgenstein's approach in the *TLP*. It is also featured in the work of Ernst Mach —and in a famous self-portrait.