

intolerable asinine if not perfunctoriously abracent

MY PART ONLY OF

VARIOUS INFORMAL ONLINE CONVERSATIONS

My two cents which may or may not be helpful:

You might want to read the first draft of B & T which is translated by Ingo Farin and someone else. It's only 100 pages, so you get an overview pretty quickly, and the language tends to be more direct.

To me Dasein plays a special role because we are "in" language/meaning together. Not atomic consciousness looking through a key hole but (roughly) "streamings of the world from a point of view." Heidegger connects his overall vision to Leibniz in Basic Problems Of Phenomenology. Heidegger's Dasein is (roughly) a monad, something more like being-THE-world-from-a-perspective rather than just being "in" a world. IMV, this is close to Wittgenstein in the Tractatus. Dasein "is" its there, and not a mere subject-like piece of the there.

A crucial part of time is the way the past leaps ahead. We are constituted by prejudice, thrown into a particular tribal software and all kinds of presuppositions that are too deep to grasp as such. But these are foregrounded in the process of interpretation. Gadamer is great on this. Phenomenology has to be hermeneutical because "language" is not like icing on a cake but woven into the lifeworld completely.

This reminds me (in a good way) of Lee Braver's "impersonal conceptual schemes." Also of what Young writes about the later Heidegger. "Being" has a kind of inexhaustible infinitude. A "sending of being" would be something like the contingent articulation of Being into a world of objects. As if "the infinite" could be sliced up in an infinity of ways into various intentional entities. To think that a particular articulation is Final is "metaphysics" in the pejorative sense — a reduction of inexhaustible "Being." Rorty (as you probably know) talked of (the dream of) "cutting nature at its joints." As if those joints were absolute and independent of a contingent way of life.

I think we agree that experience is always discursive. The "hidden faces" of Being are only vaguely available via our awareness of the contingency of our categories.

The "universality" of the symbols you mention are what I mean by "constituting ideality." Personally, I think concepts are "real," but they can be created and modified. So this gives us a "liquid" ontological rationalism.

Does conception FALSIFY the "pre-conceptual given"? Or should we think of a revelation that is always PARTIAL? Does the "pre-conceptual given" function as a synonym for poly-sided Being? I think of the "horizon." A world of corners and shadows. Ambiguity and uncertainty as "positive phenomena," genuinely real. So reality is itself fuzzier here and more

crystallized there. Anti-realist thought I suppose, because I think most realists presuppose an already-determinate reality "out there." In my view, this realism tacitly equates thought and being, despite its intentions to gesture beyond all human taint.

It makes sense that you'd mention Nietzsche. It becomes clearer to me how much Heidegger learned from Nietzsche. The fundamental "lie" of imposing "sameness" by ignoring difference. River of Heraclitus. But we "live" in these concepts. So "lie" is a tricky metaphor here, since it opposed to the "truth" of the "ineffable."

I find myself leaning more toward Husserl, at least in the terms of a "liquid" conceptualism. In some sense, our "lying" conceptuality is more "real" than the "sensation" it organizes. Impossible of the discrete on the continuum. But calling the continuum an initial unity is (arguably) already saying "too much." Sort of like an X, which takes us back to "Being."

2

(1) Sometimes new terms are helpful, to get distance from old frameworks. For instance, "Dasein" in Heidegger. I'd say it'd be very wrong to read this as subject, as the point is to radically rethink the subject-object framework. In my case, "torrent" is a slight modification of "stream." Not really necessary, but we need not forbid ourselves a little poetry.

(2) I consider my view to be fundamentally "nondual." But my emphasis on "idea" or "concept" (for lack of a

less "subjectivistic" word, and in a non-psychological sense) puts me much closer to Hegel than Democritus. But I reject the notion of "consciousness" altogether. I completely avoid saying that the world is "made of" some kind of "stuff." I think my view is pretty close to William James' — though I try to avoid the word "experience" for what is simply the presence of all kinds of entities in the world. I do take "from-a-point-of-view-ness" seriously, though, and even make it fundamental — a bit like Leibniz, though without the unnecessary mirror metaphor, which still reeks of the mystification of a "consciousness" stuff. To be fair, he might have just been trying to get himself understood. FWIW, I think my view is close to Advaita Vedanta, but I'm not interested in the "spiritual" aspect, only the conceptual overcoming of what I see as the logical quagmire of indirect realism.

(3) From what I know about Kastrup, I think so, more or less, with a troubling twist. Here's a quote "The matter constituting the inanimate universe is, thus, what transpersonal experiences unfolding outside the alters look like from the point of view of an alter, just as a living brain is what personal experiences look like." This "transpersonal experience" seems like Berkeley's God all over again. The use of "experience" subjectivizes intention and perception. Following Heidegger, I insist that concepts are "transcendent" (interpersonal) and "outside" rather than "inside." Unless the subjective idealist framework is demolished, which features a "capsule" full of "mental contents," no real progress is made. Concepts as

"transcendent" are "immediately" social and world-directed. There is no "private language." Rightly or not, I tend to think of Kastrup as purveying a kind of religion. I realize that any critique of physicalism will be suspected of crypto-theism or mysticism, but I personally identify with critical-skeptical-empirical thinkers like Mach. I don't want to introduce a new mystification. I want to unsentimentally draw out our presuppositions and their implications. The "forum" is, I claim, presupposed as scientific horizon. This "embarrassing" fact, as I see it, is grasped by following the logic against the prejudices of an age. I take some comfort, though, in the prevalence of a properly neutral "logical phenomenalism" in the Vienna Circle. Kastrup, of course, is doing something very different, despite surface similarities, in my view.

3

Yes, I concede something like that. But instead of various "streams of consciousness" representing some "external world," I prefer (for intricate reasons) to think these streams "constitute" the world. In rough terms, a "stream of phenomenal consciousness" is a "piece" or "face" of the world itself. There is no "real world" or "aperspectival world" hidden "behind" these "torrents" (monads, Dasein, streams). The world "is" this system of "streams."

In the same way, "appearances" of objects aren't representations but pre-sentations. The objects have their "reality" in such "appearances." Finally, we can dis-

cuss all of this because of a fundamentally shared "constituting ideality." We are "in language" together, not encapsulated in "bubbles." Objects (including concepts) are "between" us not "inside us." Indeed we are the "disclosure" or "presence" of objects/concepts "from a point of view." No object is completely present, because the "idea" of the concept includes a potential infinity of aspects. Logic is fundamentally interpersonal in an open and unlimited way.

4

These "streams" aren't things but the "presence" or "being" of things — the "there-ness" of those dogs and cats, which will be given in "aspects" or "profiles." You and I will see different sides of those dogs and cats and both agree that even though the sensory presence of those dogs and cats varies it's still the sensory presence of the same dogs and cats. So streams are just the perspectival presence of objects as conceptually organized sensation. (Really there's just the dogs and cats, but we can theoretically explicate the role that "concept" plays in "identifying" various sensory presentations as presentations OF the same "public" or "interpersonal" entity.)

Keep in mind that I reject the notion of consciousness. No "container" of "images." The dogs and cats "are" the collection of all sensory presence "under" the "idea" that unifies this presence. So streams are not things but just their perspectival presence. (I think

it's possible to even deconstruct these streams to some degree. Only an internal continuity makes the concept a stream appropriate. For Locke, personal identity was largely a matter of memory. The concept of a stream, in other words, is a thing, just as the word "presence" is present but points away from entities to "there being here.")

5

I should clarify that I allow for a potential infinity of "streams", including non-human streams. Every object is only ever partially given. What you and I experience in terms of color and sound may present itself in undreamed of ways to friendly curious aliens. Just as a blind person can learn to talk about color, and understand that the unseen apple is red, we could discuss the dogs and cats with aliens on the other side of the room. The "idea" would be between us, despite the severe variance in the sensory component of the perspectival presence of said dogs and cats. Objects (like dogs and cats) are fundamentally infinite and inexhaustible. They are fundamentally "interpersonal." So there is ALWAYS reality outside of a stream, at least potentially. The "thing" holds "faces in reserve." This follows from the "idea" of the object. The essence of the object is our co-intending of it. Ideas are fundamentally "out there" and "between us." The "Cartesian subject" (a bubble of private consciousness) is rejected. Instead we have something like a "forum." Sociality is prior to individuality via the

way that concepts are between rather than inside us. This is one reason the word "experience" is misleading, as it's historically associated with some "inner movie." To quote Wittgenstein, "experience is world and does not need the subject."

6

Hi. Have we already been talking on YouTube ? Someone mentioned emailing me, but I also have my email up on my website.

Since I'm not sure if we've already talked, I'll assume not, just in case. I can give some general advice. You probably want a big-picture overview. Like Durant's *The Story Of Philosophy*. A great little book. T

More general advice : Never waste time on what bores you. Keep looking around until something grabs you. It should always be fun. Also, if at all possible, discuss ideas with others. In my opinion, that's just as important as reading. I spent years on a philosophy forum talking to all kinds of people. I wrote thousands of posts. To me that was arguably more valuable than my formal education, because it became natural and easy for me to find words my thoughts. In school, I only had to write a few papers. Students like this at the time, and teachers mostly don't want to read papers. But that's the primary value of liberal education, IMO. Writing is even more important than reading, except that you have to read to keep your mind stocked with new material. Writing is the way

to assimilate the ideas of others. If you can't paraphrase it, you don't really understand it yet. To me this is the ethical part of philosophy. You have to be honest about your confusion. The stuff I'm focused on with my channel only really become clear to me about a year ago. Of course I needed to put in the time to get there. I just had a little conceptual breakthrough a little while ago, which I'm going to develop through writing.

As far as content on my channel goes, the quickest way to understand what I'm talking about is to look into phenomenology. Heidegger especially. But even here you might want to ease in with an overview of phenomenology. Honestly, I would haunt libraries and pick up lots of books and find a writing style that appealed to me. I discovered many obscure thinkers this way. Then I'd buy the ones that proved themselves as I read them at leisure at home. There's also lots of pdfs out there for free these days.

I hope some of this is helpful.

7

Yes, we have to distinguish between sign and signified. Derrida said (approximately) that metaphysics depends on the possibility of translation, which seems about right. He also rightly saw that communication involves a continual slippage. We might say that the idea is also always ideal, a kind of point at infinity.

I can only guess about animals. Brandom makes a

good case that animals aren't genuine concept users. Of course this depends on how one understands the concept of concept. For Brandom, inferential norms are the key. A sense of when P follows from Q, where P and Q employ concepts working together in order to generate claims. For Brandom, these claims are the semantic atom. (This ties into our discussion of selfhood as locus of responsibility.)

Even the only-imaginary Fido is a unity of time-varying manifestation as we keep intending the same Fido in an ever-new developing context. If have to assume that you are asking me about that same Fido from earlier, right? We "track" this "ideal" "idea" of Fido through time and "between us." Engaged in the process of sense-making. Both "aimed outward" toward public concepts, trying to obtain some greater illumination thereof. Intentionally exposed to the unpredictable statements of the other. As I see it, this conversation is an example of the presupposed co-intending I'm talking about.

I agree that people seek the right conception of Fido, but I don't think there is the one right concept that is already out there. As you mention, different cultures use different sounds for the "same" idea. In my view, we "live" in a reality that is structured largely by our own evolving concepts. I don't think there is an "already conceptualized" true reality for us to conform to. Of course reality "fights" us. Our concept creation is constrained. Which would explain why translation tends to be possible, especially in terms of ordinary

objects.

Of course in our cultural the "self" is singular. One is one around here. My point is that we can see this as a very ancient form of technology. The basis of culture as perhaps almost all humans have known it. So of course we talk in terms of singular subjects that are faced with objects. But sci-fi and fantasy plays with other possibilities, which shows their logical possibility. Even old Locke considered the strange nature of selfhood. If you could completely wipe someone's memory — including their habits and tendencies — they'd have the same body. But you might feel strange about punishing them for a crime committed before the "personality wipe." Have you seen *Altered Carbon*? They really play with this idea of the personality as something that can be moved from body to body. To get revenge (its a dark show), one has to track down the temporary host. Genuine "murder" involves destroying a kind of "soul cartridge." It's a huge crime in the world of the show to put your "soul" into more than one body at a time.

8

Yes, the "idea" of Lincoln was created. In my view, we create ideas all of the time. Constantly.

The problem of proper names is a deep one. People might think they are talking about the same person for 15 minutes and then change their mind. But I think rational conversation presupposes a sufficient if

not perfect co-intending of the same entities. Note that even if Fido is a hallucination, I can still discuss this hallucination with others. Just as I am discussing an imaginary Fido right now.

This "co-intending" is basic, it seems to me. We "share a world" through our sense of co-intending the same objects. I think the core of perception is a "recognition" that gathers the sensory under the idea. "Oh, here comes Fido again to get a bite of this chicken from my plate." Fido is not equivalent to any particular sensory manifestation of Fido over time. Fido (the "being a particular entity") is a synthesis of this time-varying manifestation — and in an interpersonal sense. Unless I decide that Fido is a hallucination, I grasp Fido as "also including" the "sensory presence" of Fido for others. They may have better vision. Or maybe I'm blind, and I only HEARD Fido coming over for the chicken. But we can all talk about the same Fido. We usually have a strong sense of this successful reference. (I agree with you that it can break down).

Inferentialism sees concepts as inherently related. So even if Fido has a specific identity, we'd make sense of Fido in a "larger field" of concepts. If Fido started walking through walls, we might stop thinking of him as a dog. Or we would enlarge our concept of dog. It's all very fluid and social. So I don't think concepts live in some magic space. They are just the "categorical form" of the world, in a very mundane way. Do you know the ship of Theseus ? Same as the river of

Heraclitus. Not the same water, but the same river is intended. The idea unifies all of what are therefore the states of river, its continually changing water.

This is where selfhood comes in. We learn to think of ourselves as one "stream of experience." One could vaguely imagine a society where 7 different souls get a chance to control the body. Maybe there's an initiation ritual every so many years. The idea that the self is singular rather than plural is familiar but not obviously logically necessary. My hunch is that it's an economical solution. One soul per body. Easy to figure out who to reward / punish. Probably easier on the brain too.

9

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10

1) Notebooks, page 89. Some really good stuff scattered in those notebooks, including a redundancy theory of truth.

(2) Ideas are ”between us” AS the logical-temporal-interpersonal syntheses of their ”aspects” or ”appearances.” You might ask how we are having this conversation right now. I claim that ”the forum” is radically presupposed by all earnest conversation. This ”forum” includes ”public concepts” which are also objects with ”faces.” As in we intend the same concept while seeing it differently. Otherwise clarification would be impossible.

(3) Note that I allow for an infinity of streams to exist. The ”idea” of the object, as ”transcendent” and ”between” all actual and possible members of ”the forum” is fundamentally infinite and ”ajar.” ”Da-

sein" is "transcending intentionality." Not a "capsule" of "mental contents" but the genuine revelation/disclosure or "presence" of the present. Dasein/existence is time is the "nothingness" which "presents" things. The "stream" is the perspectival presence of reality itself, which is fundamentally infinite inasmuch as it is "conceptual" or structured in terms of concepts that are "between" us. Indeed, they have to be "between" because "streams" have no "interior." The stream metaphor invokes "time" as the varying manifestation of enduring entities in the world. Ideas are "ideal" and unify "sensory presence" into interpersonal things. As Witt, Sartre, and Heid saw, the traditional subject is one more thing in the world. It's the mistaking of subjectivity as something present that is criticized.

To put it in a rough way, "witness consciousness" or "absolute consciousness" isn't consciousness at all but just world-from-perspective. This ties into the brute spatiality of the world. (We might be able to derive torrents from transcendent things — as one more piece of the ideal/conceptual organization of presence.) In short, "reality needs no witness to shine."