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1

The *normative* ontological horizon. The rational Forum, place of assembly. Persona. Mask. Clump of freedom-responsibility. Typically transparent. Or (another metaphor) backgrounded, horizontal.

2

Scientism's blindspot, the very normativity it implicitly employs. Misunderstanding of the self as a thing in the causal nexus. A failure to see the evolving nexus as a piece of the dynamic nexus of inferential norms. In other words, the "projection" of a mathematical model is only "scientific" if *warranted*. Such warrant depends on "political" "basic statements." On the contact with articulated experience. Which is finally where the phenomenal stream, that ugly issue, interferes. We have to agree upon some "facts" for the model to fit or fail to fit. Our lifeworld serves as normative — more or less trustworthy — meatdolls.

3

The "Absolute" is a shattered system of plural "subjectlike-substance." My first-personal en-worlded sense-making. Yours too. My mundane beliefs the "meaning-spine" of Our-reality-from-my-perspective. "I" am a ghost-driven meatdoll. This "ghost" is not "mind stuff"

but “ethical” stuff. “Freedom” as responsibility. All the world’s a stage, a forum structured by responsibility. To, for instance, make a case for one’s beliefs. Though this rational aspect of the forum is a mere piece of it. Deeper than the rest is the technology of selfhood. One is one around here. One deed-and-claim-responsible time-binding “ghost” per body. This body a meatwagon host for a budding idiolect of the tribal software. The core of this programming is selfhood itself.

4

Belief-structured unrolling phenomenal field. Ontological “ego” encompassing a linguistic-empirical-normative ego. Actor on the stage, citizen of the forum. The temporal unity of a voice. The presence of the self to/for the self. The words that pour through what “I” call a *mono*-logue. I swear it’s just me in here. Gluing perceptions and claims and “experiences” into a singular subject who does/has them.

5

Science tacitly presupposes the installation of this software subject. Along with the rational-ontological horizon. Forum for the rational co-determination of belief. Presupposes some beliefs are better than others. More “rational” or appropriate. Determination of what One ought to believe, as hygienically Rational “idiolect.”

6

Rational as real, real as rational. The really real is the world as (tacitly perspectively) structured by “rational” belief. The real is the-world-from-the-perspective-of-the-ideally-sapient. This is of course a reduced or filtered real. Like the pragmatic real that ejects “hallucinations” which exist of course in wider sense. So that they can be intended and excluded in the first place.

7

(Generalized) materialism is tacitly anti-perspectival. Indeed, it is even tacitly anti-empirical. To the degree that “primary qualities” are representations. But even the exclusion of “secondary qualities” is anti-empirical in a less radical sense. That even primary qualities are only ever accessed “perspectively” is the problem with this approach, as Berkeley saw. Even tactile extension or spatiality is perspectival. It takes time for me to molest the object and construct a sense of its shape. The denial of time. The idea being that different random-path molestations should result in a similar sense of tactile spatiality. Which is probably the case. But even this does not escape from perspectival access. We need finally to “mathematically imagine” tactile extension (with its fixed volume) from all perspectives. Or from no perspective as a latent Cause of a perspectival access that becomes representational rather than presentational. Almost a radicalization of

J. S. Mill.

8

But Mill refused to abandon the empirical. Possibility of “sensation” is founded on actual sensation. Mill saw that the object is not dependent on *my* sensation. The material object, for Mill, was an *interpersonal* possibility of sensation. Such “Matter” was independent of any *particular* nondual phenomenal stream. But the no-longer-empirical Materialist dreams of a total independence of the entity from *all* phenomenal streams. So the actual perspectival presence of the object is made secondary, representation, unreal.

9

This (accidentally) “post-empirical” materialist misunderstands the logical substance of the entity. The intelligent lifeforms on Xenon have 9 sense organs, one of which seems to be analogous to human eyes. We haven’t been able to make sense of what the others are like. But somehow the Xenonians have learned English well enough to convince us that they can discuss puppies, popcorn, and promises with us. We imagine that they have their own inaccessible-to-us “phenomenal fields.” That objects are “perceptually present” for them in a way analogous to the way they are present for us. Present as opposed to remembered or hypothesized.

The Xenonians have found their way into our ontological forum. They are “essentially human” inasmuch as the normative linguistic “ghost” that only contingently “wears” a biologically human body is our essence. As Feuerbach makes clear in his explication of the concept of God as a disembodied projection of our own linguistic-normative essence.

The “thing in itself” is just the thing *as* itself, stripped of its particular-contingent perspectival-sensuous content — its “location” in semantic-inferential “space.” Venusians and Saturnians have very different sense organs. They tend to agree that objects are probably perceptually present for them in a very different ways. But their ability to reference the same object — or their strong sense that they are able to do so — suggests to all concerned that such varying perceptual presence is conceptually structured in both cases in terms of logical-intentional “substance.” However different their manner of perception, they both perceive the entity through its moments or aspects grasped as a “logical system” of those aspects. This “logical system” is interpersonal and endures through time. The logical substance of the object glues together its perspectival parts (its moments) together.

12

A person born blind knows the taste and the feel and the inferential and symbolic role of apples. This blind person can discuss apples with another *sighted* person who has only seen pictures of them and read about them.

13

What is meaning ? Can we say what meaning “really is” any more than we can say what color “really is”? Meaningful language allows us to conjure a situation that is not perceptually present which we could recognize if it were to become perceptually present. This we can say. But what the “significance” of situation ? Other than itself ?

This encourages a mystified understanding of the word “truth.” I strongly believe in a situation that is perceptually present. Belief is the intelligible or significant structure *of* that presence. In ordinary life, we check the “truth” of a represented state-of-affairs against its perceptual presence.

The perceptually present can, however, be revised. We can revise the logical-pragmatic structure of the phenomenal field. The man up ahead in the dark turns out to be a sign or an elaborate mailbox. Belief is systematic and cumulative. Certain translations or revisions of the field are far more likely than others.

I see the man up ahead become a harmless sign on

my walk to meet my girlfriend. It helps that I know about signs and their relationships to roads. The phenomenal stream is structured by a goal. Subject-like substance. Bent or shaped by care. The being of the stream is largely a caring about that being. Avoid pain, seek pleasure. More or less vague total life goal. Many sub-goals. A variety of simple animal goals. Hunger, the need to urinate, but not right there on the sidewalk. Passage through the rich structures of the lifeworld.